ROQUE D.A. DATOR, G.R. No. 169464
Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
REV. FR. TAMERLANE LANA and Promulgated:
REV. FR. RODEL
ALIGAN,
Respondents. August 31, 2006
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YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
This
petition for review on certiorari[1] assails
the April 27, 2005 Decision[2] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81378, which reversed the August 29,
2003 Decision[3] and
October 30, 2003 Resolution[4] of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CA No. 034433-03 and
dismissed petitioner’s complaint for lack of merit; and its August 24, 2005
Resolution[5]
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner
Roque D.A. Dator was hired by respondent University of Santo Tomas (UST) in
June 1983 as Instructor I of the
Thus, on
Petitioner
asked for reconsideration of the reduction in his teaching load which was
granted. He was given an additional load
of three teaching hours.[6]
On
June 15, 2001, petitioner again requested for an additional load of three units
but his request was denied by respondent Rev. Fr. Aligan on the ground that “[t]o
grant the request when one was already made before for humanitarian and
equitable reasons would reduce the subject policy to naught and the granting
might become the general rather than the exception to the policy.”[7]
Petitioner filed a
Complaint-Affidavit[8] to the
Chairperson of the Grievance Committee, Dr. Gil Gamila, President of the
Petitioner thus filed a complaint for
Illegal Reduction of Teaching Load and Illegal Change of Employment Status,
Damages, Unpaid Benefits and Attorney’s Fees and illegal constructive dismissal
before the Labor Arbiter on
Petitioner
claimed that his arbitrary demotion from full-time to part-time faculty member
violated the provisions of the CBA, as well as his right to security of tenure. Likewise, he argued that the UST Faculty Code
which respondents relied upon to reduce his teaching load has been superseded
by the CBA. In support of his contentions,
petitioner cited the following sections of Article IV of the CBA:
Section 3.
x x
x x
Section 5. Reduction of Teaching Load. – The teaching load of a faculty
member may be reduced for any of the following reasons:
a) A reduction in the number of classes or
sections in the faculty, college, school or department concerned, provided
that, in such case a compensating load in other faculties, colleges, school or
department shall, as far as possible, be made available to the faculty member
concerned;
b) Non-offering of his/her specialized
subject along his/her expertise in any given semester or school year;
c) By way of sanction for inefficiency
duly proven after due process and in accordance with standards or criteria in
force in the UNIVERSITY;
d) Failing Health of the faculty member
duly certified by a Board of three (3) physicians teaching in the Faculty of
Medicine and Surgery of the University chosen as follows: one by the faculty
member concerned, one by the UNIVERSITY and one by the FACULTY UNION.
Section 6. Procedure for the Reduction of Load. –
In case of deloading that affects permanent faculty members, the following
rules shall be observed, to wit:
a) The available subject shall first be
given to the faculty members who have been teaching the particular subject;
b) Seniority as to the number of years of
handling the particular subject shall be used as basis in the distribution of
the available particular subject;
c) In case the faculty member concerned
shall have taught the particular subject for an equal length of time priority
shall be given to the faculty member having a higher rank;
d) In case the faculty member concerned
shall have taught the particular subject for an equal length of time and
holding the same rank, preference shall be given to the faculty member who has
a higher efficiency rating;
e) In case the matter cannot be settled by
the use of the foregoing data, the particular available subjects shall be
distributed to the faculty members concerned in proportion to the faculty
members’ average teaching assignment in the immediately preceding school year.
In the case of
non-tenured faculty members, priority in the distribution of available subjects
among them in the event of a bona-fide deloading shall be in accordance with
the following criteria that are to be applied in the order of mention to wit:
a) length
of service;
b) number
of semesters of handling the particular subject; and
c) efficiency
rating.
Section 7. Notice of deloading. Faculty
members who shall be affected by a process of deloading should be given a
written notice thereof, at least two (2) weekes before the start of every
semester; conversely, faculty members who, for one reason or another, are not
available to teach for the succeeding semester, should inform the dean of such
fact at least two (2) weeks before the start of the semester.
On
the other hand, respondents maintained that petitioner’s teaching load was reduced
in accordance with Sections 5 and 6 of Article III of the Faculty Code which
provide:
SEC. 5 – Faculty members who have a
full time outside employment other than teaching may not be given a teaching
load in excess of 12 hours per week. The
maximum load of part time employees should be arranged in accordance with the
following table:
Hours of Weekly Work Load
40-48 12 Units
30-39 15 Units
20-29 18 Units
10-19 21
Units
SEC. 6 – All faculty members shall
submit each semester in writing to their respective Deans a statement of the
number of teaching hours per week to be rendered in other institutions and/or
daily hours of work or employment, inside or outside the University.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of
respondents holding that the situation contemplated in Section 5, Article III
of the Faculty Code, when evaluated together with the provisions of the CBA, constitutes
a ground for teaching load reduction.[11]
On appeal, the NLRC ordered the restoration
of petitioner’s faculty member status to full-time. Respondents’ motion for reconsideration was
denied. Petitioner’s partial motion for
reconsideration with regard to the award for backwages and damages was likewise
denied.
Respondents filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals which reversed the NLRC decision and sustained
the findings of the Labor Arbiter in its assailed Decision dated April 27,
2005, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we
hereby GRANT the petition. The decision dated August 29, 2003 and the
order dated October 30, 2003 of the National Labor Relations Commission in the
case “Roque A. Dator vs.
SO ORDERED. [12]
The
Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition raising the following
issues:
THE APPELLATE COURT GROSSLY DEPARTED FROM
APPLICABLE
LAW AND PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE
I
IN NOT FINDING [THAT]
PETITIONER’S DELOADING WAS WITHOUT JUST CAUSE, WITHOUT DUE PROCESS AND IN
VIOLATION OF AN EXTANT CBA BETWEEN UST AND THE UST FACULTY
II
IN ITS FLAWED
INTERPRETATION OF THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE CBA AND THE UST FACULTY CODE
III
IN FINDING [THAT] PETITIONER
HAD COMMITTED MISREPRESENTATION
IV
IN FINDING THAT
PETITIONER HAD THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN SHOWING THAT OTHER FACULTY MEMBERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED WERE GIVEN FULL-TIME LOADS
V
IN FAILING TO SEE
THAT RESPONDENT UST HAD ALREADY ADMITTED IN ITS PLEADINGS THAT OTHER GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES HAD BEEN GRANTED FULL-TIME TEACHING LOADS
VI
IN FAILING TO FIND [THAT]
UST HAD ACTED IN BAD FAITH.[13]
Petitioner
contends that he is a tenured faculty member thus he is entitled to the same
teaching load as he had in the previous semesters; that he was not accorded due
process when respondents unilaterally reduced his teaching load; that Section
5, Article III of the Faculty Code has no application in this case; and that
respondents acted in bad faith.
Respondents
maintain that petitioner’s teaching load was reduced in accordance with Section
5, Article III of the Faculty Code; that they did not violate petitioner’s
right to due process and that he was given an opportunity to be heard; that
petitioner falsified at least 13 written statements where he deliberately
failed to mention his full time employment with the Office of the Ombudsman.
The
petition lacks merit.
The
issues for resolution are: 1) whether
the reduction of petitioner’s teaching load was justified; and 2) whether petitioner
was denied due process.
We
agree with the Court of Appeals’ ruling that while the CBA provides grounds for
reduction of teaching load, the question of whether a faculty member is
considered full-time or part-time is addressed by the Faculty Code which
provides that where the full-time faculty member is at the same time working as
a full-time employee elsewhere, the faculty member is considered part-time and a
12-hour teaching load limitation is imposed.
There is no dispute that petitioner was
holding a full-time position with the Office of the Ombudsman while working as
a faculty member in UST. Accordingly,
Section 5, Article III of the Faculty Code applies. We quote with approval the ruling of the Court
of Appeals, to wit:
We completely disagree with the NLRC’s
conclusions as it applied the wrong rules and misappreciated the evidence on
record. The NLRC gravely abused its
discretion on this point for its complete disregard of the Faculty Code.
While
the NLRC correctly viewed the CBA as the primary instrument that governs the
relationship between UST and its unionized faculty members, it disregarded
Article XX of this CBA which reconciles the CBA with the Faculty Code. Article XX states:
“ARTICLE XX
FACULTY CODE
The
provisions of the Faculty Code of 1981, as amended, which are not otherwise
incorporated in the CBA and which are not in conflict with any provisions of
the latter shall remain in full force and effect.
In
the event of conflict between a faculty code provision and the CBA, the
provision of the latter shall prevail.” (Emphasis supplied)
Thus,
contrary to the NLRC’s conclusion, the UST Faculty Code continues to exist and
to apply to UST faculty members, but must give way if its terms are in conflict
with what the CBA provides. The standard
in determining the applicable rule – and the one that the NLRC completely
missed – is whether a conflict exists between the provisions the parties cited.
We
see no conflict between the provisions the parties respectively cited as these
provisions apply to different situations.
Article IV of the CBA are the rules on the teaching loads that faculty
members may normally expect to carry; it provides as well the grounds or
reasons for giving a tenured faculty member less than his normal teaching
load. These provisions do not address
the question of when a faculty member is to be considered a full-time or a
part-time faculty member. Whether a
faculty member should only be on part-time basis is governed by Section 5
Article III of the UST Faculty Code we have quoted above. Thus, the provisions Dator cited regarding
deloading and the authorized grounds therefore do not apply because what is
involved is a change of status from full-time faculty member to a part-time one
due to the faculty member’s full-time employment elsewhere.
In
contrast with the “authorized” causes for deloading under the CBA, the change
of status from full-time faculty member with a 24-unit load to a part-time one
with a 12-unit load in effect involves a “disqualification” to be a full-time
faculty member because of the very practical reason that he or she is already a
full-time employee elsewhere. In the
present case, this “disqualification” is compounded by Dator’s repeated
misrepresentations about his employment status outside UST. The present case therefore is closer to being
a disqualification situation coupled with a disciplinary cause, rather than one
involving a purely “authorized” deloading under the CBA.[14]
Petitioner argues that he was under
no obligation to disclose his employment with the Office of the Ombudsman. He
claims that the only information required of him pertained to 1) other colleges
where he is teaching, 2) teaching loads outside the university, and 3) a
business firm he is employed with. He
argues that the Office of the Ombudsman, being a government agency, does not
fall under any of the foregoing categories.[15]
Petitioner’s argument is flimsy and
deserves scant consideration.
Section 6, Article III of the Faculty
Code states that all faculty members must submit each semester a statement of
the number of teaching hours per week to be rendered in other institutions and/or
daily hours of work or employment, inside or outside the University. The rationale behind the rule is
unmistakable. As pointed out by
respondents, there is a need to maintain UST’s quality of education as well as
to ensure that government service is not jeopardized.[16]
Petitioner admitted in his letter-request
dated July 15, 2001 that “with the implementation of a CHED Circular, the
teaching load assignment of government employees was limited to only 12 units
per semester x x x so as not to prejudice the interests of both the government
and the University and/or college concerned.”[17] It is clear therefore that petitioner was
aware of the limitation.
Moreover, we find that petitioner was
not denied due process. It is settled
that due process is simply an opportunity to be heard.[18] In this case, respondents informed petitioner
that his teaching load would be reduced as he was working full-time with the
Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner asked
for reconsideration twice. His first
request was granted and he was given an additional load of three units for
School Year 2000-2001. For School Year
2001-2002, petitioner again requested an additional load of three units but was
denied.
Upon denial of his second request,
petitioner availed of the grievance procedure provided in the CBA.[19] Yet again, after his complaint was dismissed, petitioner
appealed directly to respondent Fr. Lana.
As observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioner exhausted the internal
mechanism of seeking redress within UST’s administrative machinery.[20] Contrary
to petitioner’s claims, he was accorded due process.
We likewise reject petitioner’s claim
that respondents acted in bad faith. A
review of the record reveals that respondents merely implemented the Faculty
Code which clearly sets a 12-hour load limitation to faculty members who are also
full-time employees elsewhere. And while
petitioner decries an alleged discrimination against him, he failed to prove his
allegations with substantial evidence which is that amount of evidence a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[21]
All told, petitioner’s complaint
cannot be sustained. An employee’s bare
allegations of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on
record, cannot be given credence.[22] As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
A constructive dismissal occurs when
the law deems that there is effectively a termination of employment or “a
quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or
unlikely, such as in an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in
pay.” Where, as in the present case, the
employer was fully justified in giving a faculty member a lesser load because
the latter is disqualified under applicable rules from handling a full load,
and where the faculty member committed repeated misrepresentations in his bid
to maintain his full load, we cannot see any legal or factual basis to conclude
that the faculty member had been constructively dismissed.
We
conclude from all these that UST committed no illegality when it ordered the
reduction of Dator’s load from twenty-four (24) units to twelve (12) units per
semester. Substantively, there was
factual basis for deloading.
Procedurally, Dator had been given full opportunity to be heard. He was even accommodated for one school year
with an extra three-unit load that he accepted.
After this acceptance and the express recognition that indeed he could
only handle a twelve-unit load, private respondent Dator can no longer claim
that he should after all been given a full twenty-four unit load. Thus, the NLRC”s conclusions - based on a
skewed reading of the facts and the application of the wrong rules - cannot but
be attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.[23]
WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 27, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81378 ordering the dismissal of petitioner’s
complaint for lack of merit; and its Resolution dated August 24, 2005 denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 8-27.
[2]
[3] CA
rollo, pp. 35-49. Penned by Commissioner Victoriano R. Calaycay and
concurred in by Commissioners Raul T. Aquino and Angelita A. Gacutan.
[4]
[5] Rollo, pp. 53-56.
[6] CA
rollo, p. 408.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Rollo, p. 50.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
CA rollo, p. 410.
[18] Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative,
Inc. v. Macaraeg, 443 Phil. 866, 876 (2003).
[19] Rollo, p. 11.
[20]
[21] Iriga Telephone Co., Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 350 Phil. 245, 253 (1998).
[22] Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158922,
[23] Rollo, pp. 49-50.